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JUDGES AND ECONOMICS:
NORMATIVE, POSITIVE, AND EXPERIMENTAL
PERSPECTIVES
SAUL LEVMORE*
The question of how judges ought to use economics depends
in large part on the sort of law and economics ajudge practices,
in some part on the judge's ability to do it well, and in a small
way on the long-term view one takes of what the community of
judges is engaged in accomplishing.
I. NoRMATIVE AND POSITIVE STRATEGIES
One struggles to express anything but mixed feelings about
the normative use of law and economics in judicial
decisionmaking. When judges are wise, when they correctly
perceive the behavioral effects of their decisions, or when they
can see how their opinions might control other decisionmakers,
they are tempted to set the world right. A practical (and
undemocratic) way to think of this is from the perspective of
comparative institutions: when judges seem better at
policymaking than legislatures or agencies, it is enticing to ask
judges to do more rather than less. There may be a useful
analogy here to comparative law, for a similar question might be
asked regarding the extent to which judges ought to copy
* Brokaw Professor of Corporate Law and Albert Clark Tate,Jr. Professor, University
of Virginia School of Law.
1. This is, for example, the impression most participants had at the Twelfth Annual
National Student Federalist Society Symposium on Law and Public Policy, "Judicial
Decisionmaking: The Role of Text, Precedent, and the Rule of Law," hosted by Duke
University in 1993. Judge Easterbrook spoke eloquently and sensibly about a variety of
regulatory problems, so that it would be hard to defend a decision not to delegate more
authority to this talented decisionmaker. See Frank . Easterbrook, Text Hsto3y, and
StMtUre in Stut"y Inerp re art, 17 HARV.J.L. & PUB. PoLY 61 (1994). Of course, other
judges might have elicited different reactions.
HeinOnline  -- 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 129 1997-1998
HarvardJournal of Law & Public Policy
judicial decisionmaking in other-and even in foreign--
jurisdictions. As with law and economics, being a bad
comparativist is easy because the semiliterate observer might
miss the importance of culture or of other coordinate rules. On
the other hand, other jurisdictions may have developed wise
solutions to difficult problems and one risks playing the fool in
ignoring their evolution and decisionmaking. Comparative law
(or judging) is surely to be encouraged in the hands of the
skilled craftsman.
The arguments against the normative application of law and
economics scarcely need rehashing here. Much of economics is
built on questionable assumptions. Its very design is influenced
by the positive character of most social science. It accepts a good
deal as exogenously given, when law has the power to change
much of the status quo. And the list goes on and on. If the
question posed is, "How should judges make normative use of
law and economics?", the answer is, "Wisely."2
The positive value of law and economics seems richer and less
controversial, yet less appreciated. Law and economics has the
capacity to uncover explanations for legal rules. Thus, where
generations of lawyers have memorized a seemingly arbitrary or
even inferior rule, law and economics may suggest an
explanation for the stirvival or appearance of the rule.
Sometimes the explanation presents an evolutionary story of the
rule, but often the explanation offers a defense of the rule.
Thus, a rule that has been criticized as undercompensatory may
suddenly seem defensible when the economics-minded observer
points out its ability to control moral hazard or to elicit
information from a better-informed party. I would describe this
use of law and economics as conservative in the sense that it
suggests that we temper our zeal for reform with an appreciation
that those who came before us often produced ingenious rules
whose worth we may be slow to recognize. Any number of areas
2. One might draw here an analogy to the use of law and statistics. How shouldjudges
use statistics? In employment discrimination law, and in some of tort law, it seems
inconceivable that we would ask our judges to avoid the normative use of statistical
evidence and reasoning. But statistics is not a subject that comes easily to many of us, and
the law reports are full of examples of poor statistical reasoning. Still, statistical reasoning
and evidence will almost inevitably become an increasing part of law and judging. Our
hope must be that over time the community ofjudges, lawyers, and scholars will educate
one another in a way that improves the use of this methodology. This view ofjudges as
experimenters is expanded in Part II, infrt
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of law have been described as chaotic and nonsensical, only to
be rationalized through the sort of behavioralist lens offered by
law and economics. But these explanations are often subtle.
Therefore, the message forjudges (and others) may be that they
should be in no rush to innovate because time and talent may
reveal the utility of inherited rules.
This potential positive value is sometimes further camouflaged
by other perspectives such as that offered by legal history. A rule
may seem unwise, and a judge or academic or lawyer may
"explain" its existence with some historical fact. The implicit
argument is that it is safe to innovate away from this rule with no
danger of tossing out some ingenious creation of our ancestors.
We are familiar with arguments of the form "the rule is x
because Senator W wanted jurisdiction over such and such" or
"the rule is y because the Framers could not imagine problem Z."
However, such alternative, plausible explanations can be
misleading. The historical explanation may not be sufficient to
tell us why a particular rule emerged and survived, especially
once we discover that other jurisdictions with different histories
evolved toward the same, seemingly objectionable rule. I am
inclined to respect the historical explanation but to allow for the
possibility that it conceals a deeper, more universal,
complementary insight.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS EXPERIMENTS
I have suggested thus far that skilled judges will be forgiven
and even encouraged to make normative use of law-and-
economics ideas, and that all judges might be encouraged to use
law and economics to appreciate the value of the rules and
practices that we have inherited. The first point suggests a kind
of activist use of law and economics-or the opposite-
depending on one's view of the skill and self-assessment
exhibited by judges as social engineers, administrators, and
analysts. Another problem lies in skilled judges succeeding with
their innovations but encouraging other judges to copy their
activism in the name of precedent and other traditions. The
second point, regarding the positive use of law and economics,
unambiguously suggests conservative rather than activist
approaches. However, a third kind of use implied by the study of
law and economics may offset much of this second point, and I
now turn to this unrecognized role ofjudges.
No. 1]
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Once we accept the idea that judges do more than apply the
law, we can turn to various models of the ways in which judges
build on one another's work. This is not the place to explore the
interaction among judges and the effect of such horizontal and
intergenerational interaction on stability and reform of the law,
but a straightforward point is that an innovative judicial move
can be thought of as an experiment. The experiment may fail
because others may work to point out its shortcomings or
because we may observe parties absorbing serious transaction
costs in their quest to bargain around the experimental rule. But
one positive effect of innovative decisionmaking is that, for
better or worse, it enriches the data available to future
decisionmakers. Thus, judges can do good even when they are
wrong.
One may consider the argument that experimentation itself
may be of long-term value without considering law and
economics, but this argument has special applicability in the law
and economics context. Law and economics arguments are
often oriented around the question of the behavioral effects of
legal rules (or of their alternatives). The methodology suggests
that we study reactions to rules. In thinking about such diverse
matters as rent control, gender equality in the military, term
limits, and contract damages, for example, experience with
different legal rules can illuminate sensible decisionmaling
about the substance of the rules governing these matters. Future
judges and legislatures might therefore gain from some degree
of freedom exercised by current judges. In short, an argument
(perhaps a surprising one) may be made for the proposition
that judges ought to be thought of as a cooperative community
of decisionmakers whose efforts will be improved by diverse
experiences. In turn, this cooperation or group learning is
generated only if there is some flexibility and variety in the
members' decisionmaking. Once again, the value of these
experiments increases when the innovator has good sense about
where and how to experiment and when subsequent judges are
less likely to follow or reject path-breaking precedents
robotically. Law-and-economics analyses suggest particular areas
in which a great deal depends on the magnitude of multiple and
often conflicting effects that can be expected from particular
legal rules. Perhaps the use of law and economics in judging will
yield insight into the question of where innovation is most
[Vol. 21
HeinOnline  -- 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 132 1997-1998
No.1] Judges and Economics 133
valuable in the long-term, cooperative endeavor in which judges
engage.
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